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Summary: The quest for a ‘high’ level of environmental protection1 in the European 
Union (EU) is dependent on the successful implementation and enforcement of EU 
legislation by Member States. Thus, despite the fact that the Community did not 
originally have a mandate to impose the choice of instrument of implementation of 
Community Law on Member States, the decision of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) of 13 September 2005 (Commission v Council C-176/03) has finally 
established that while the Community does not have competence in criminal matters 
per se, the Community institutions may require Member States to introduce 
criminal sanctions for the protection of the environment. The ECJ has therefore 
annulled a Framework Decision of the Council which aimed at harmonising the 
criminal sanctions for protection of the environment of Member States under the 
third pillar of the EU, rather than the first pillar (which allows the Commission and 
ECJ to exercise stronger enforcement powers). These developments demonstrate 
that for the first time a supranational institution may be able effectively to enforce 
an obligation on national authorities to enact penal sanctions for environmental 
protection. The objective of this paper will be to discuss whether the harmonisation 
of environmental criminal standards may lead to better environmental protection 
within the EU. 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
                                                
* PhD Candidate, University of Essex. A shorter (unpublished) version of this paper was 
presented at the International Graduate Legal Research Conference that took place at 
King’s College in London on 12-13 April 2007, and at the ATINER 4th International 
Conference on Law, which took place in Athens on 16-17 July 2007. I would like to 
thank Karen Hulme, member of my supervisory board at the University of Essex, and 
Donald McGuillivrary, University of Kent, for their insightful comments to an earlier 
draft of this paper.   
1 Article 2 EC sets as one of the Community’s essential objectives “a high level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of the environment” (see also Article 174(2) EC). This does not mean 
protection of the environment at ‘the highest level’, as Member States are allowed under article 175 EC 
to introduce stricter standards. 
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The use of criminal sanctions for the protection of the environment is a very topical issue 
in the European Union. The European Commission asserts that the use of criminal 
sanctions by Member States could improve the level of enforcement of environmental 
regulations implementing EC environmental legislation.2 The strength of criminal 
sanctions as a deterrent is attributable to the social stigma – publicly and in the business 
community - that is attached to offenders, who face criminal prosecution or conviction, 
and to the prospect of application of imprisonment as a sanction against those offenders. 
In contrast to the situation with fines, corporate offenders, who tend to commit the 
greatest number of environmental crimes, are not able to pass the costs of incarceration 
on to consumers.3 This is the basis on which the Commission has put faith in the 
effectiveness of criminal sanctions to deter environmental offenders in EU Member 
States.  
 
Not only the Commission but also the Council and the European Parliament have 
supported the use of criminal sanctions for environmental protection. They share the view 
that approximation of environmental criminal law would allow the development of 
stronger cooperation among the Member States in the fight against environmental 
criminality, particularly in the case of environmental crimes with cross-boundary effects. 
They therefore support action at the European level to harmonise the criminal laws in 
Member States for the protection of the environment. Nevertheless, there is discord over 
the legal basis for this harmonisation. While the Commission, supported by the 
Parliament, asserts that the harmonisation of environmental criminal law is a matter to be 
dealt with under the first pillar of Community law (Article 175 EC under the title 
                                                
2 Commission Staff Working Paper, Establishing of an Acquis on Criminal Sanctions against 
Environmental Offences, Brussels, 07.02.2001, SEC (2001) 227, p. 3.  
3 Imprisonment is not possible in the case of violations of administrative or civil law. But imprisonment in 
administrative infringement procedure is possible in countries with quasi-criminal systems (in which 
the administrative agency may apply repressive sanctions) e.g. Austria and Germany. Study on 
Measures Other than Criminal Ones in Cases where Environmental Community Law has not been 
respected in the EU Member States, Summary Report, B4-304A/2003/369724/MAR/A.3, 20 
September 2004, p.14. 
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‘protection of the environment’), the Council (supported by several member states4) 
argues that the legal basis belongs to the third pillar of the EU, which relates to police and 
judicial cooperation on criminal matters (PJCC).5  
 
The adoption of an instrument of harmonisation of environmental criminal law under the 
first pillar would have several advantages: it would have direct effect on Member States, 
therefore allowing individuals to rely on their EC rights despite the failure of a Member 
State to implement the measure6; for its adoption, co-decision procedure (therefore 
enhancing Parliament’s participation in decision-making7) and qualified majority voting 
in the Council would be applied, therefore preventing a Member State from exercising 
veto powers; and the Commission and ECJ would be able to exercise full enforcement 
powers. A third pillar instrument, on the other hand, would not have direct effect on 
Member States (though it would have, after the Pupino decision, indirect effect therefore 
requiring national courts to interpret national law in accordance with EC law)8; it would 
require unanimity in the Council with the Parliament being merely consulted (therefore 
with less democratic legitimacy than a first pillar instrument); and there is almost no 
judicial or political control of implementation by Member States.    
                                                
4 Eleven of the then fifteen Member States intervened in support of the Council in the Commission v 
Council C-176/03 case. 
5 The Treaty of the European Union (TEU) 1993 created the second and third pillars leading to the 
transformation of the European Economic Community into the European Union, which is presently 
composed of three pillars. If the Constitutional Treaty ever come into force, the pillar structure of the 
EU will be abolished and the competences under the second and third pillars will be transferred to the 
competence of the Community (first pillar). 
6 See Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR1. But due to the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine 
praevia lege), a Member State that fails to implement the directive by not criminalising the illegal 
activity would not be able to prosecute an individual. See Case 168/95 Criminal proceedings against 
Luciano Arcaro [1996] ECR I-4705.   
7 The European Parliament is often regarded as the “greenest” of the EU Institutions. See Burns, C. ‘The 
European Parliament: The European Union’s Environmental Champion?’ in Jordan, A. (ed.), 
Environmental Policy in the European Union: Actors, Institutions and Processes (2dn ed. Earthscan 
2005). However, there is an argument that since the rise of the right in the last euro-election, the 
European Parliament may have lost some of its ‘green’ mantle. 
8 Case 105/03 Criminal Proceedings against Pupino [2005] ECR 5285. For a commentary on this decision 
and the consequent extension of indirect effect to third pillar measures see Fletcher, M. ‘Extending 
‘Indirect Effect’ to the Third Pillar: The Significance of Pupino’, E. L. Rev, 30 (6) 2005. 
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However the problem of the legal basis for harmonisation of environmental criminal law 
has been finally given some clarification in a landmark decision of the ECJ on 13 
September 20059. In an action brought by the Commission against the legal basis of a 
Council Framework Decision on the protection of the environment through criminal law 
of January 200310, the ECJ held that the legal basis for harmonisation should have been 
Article 175 EC – hence under the first pillar of Community law - as the main objective of 
the Council’s initiative to harmonise environmental criminal law was held to be the 
protection of the environment11. This decision opens the way for the adoption of a more 
recent proposal of the Commission for a directive (February 2007) on the protection of 
the environment through criminal law12 under the first pillar, which could allow the 
Commission and ECJ to enforce effectively the obligation on Member States to introduce 
criminal sanctions for environmental protection13.     
 
Those developments show that for the first time a supranational institution may be able to 
impose an obligation on Member States to introduce criminal sanctions for the protection 
of the environment. Before those developments at the European Union level, the Council 
of Europe had adopted a Convention in 1998 on the protection of the environment 
                                                
9 Commission v Council C-176/03 [2005] ECR I – 7879. 
10 Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA of 27 January 2003, O.J. 05.02.2003 L029/55.  
11 Case 176/03 Commission v Council [2005] ECR I – 7879, par. 51. 
12 Proposal of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of the Environment through 
Criminal Law, 2007/0022 (COD) 9.2.2007, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2007/com2007_0051en01.pdf 
13 The Commission had adopted a proposal for a directive in March 2001 (2001/0076 COD) to pre-empt the 
adoption of a February 2000 initiative from Denmark for a Framework Decision of the Council on the 
protection of the environment through criminal law.  See Comte, F. ‘Protection of the Environment 
through Criminal Law: Destiny of the Various European Union’s Initiatives’, in Europe and the 
Environment: Legal Essays in Honour of Ludwig Kramer, Onida, Marco e.d. 2004 p. 47. Since the 
Council decided to adopt the framework decision on 27 January 2003, the Commission took the 
decision to challenge the legal basis of that decision before the ECJ in April 2003. The February 2007 
proposal for directive (2007/0022) on the protection of the environment through criminal law 
supersedes the 2001 proposal. 
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through criminal law14 but this Convention has not yet received the necessary number of 
ratifications for its entry into force15. The harmonisation of environmental criminal law in 
the EU could lead to stronger cooperation between police and judicial authorities in 
Member States, to the adjustment of the existing disparate approaches in Member States 
as far as the choice of implementation technique of EC environmental law is concerned, 
and to the creation of a level-playing-field to prevent some Member States from 
becoming ‘pollution havens’ for the dirty industries, especially in view of the two most 
recent EU enlargements eastwards.   
 
However, according to the subsidiarity principle applied in EU law and enshrined in the 
Treaty16, the EU sets the standards, leaving to Member States the choice of how to 
implement those standards17. This has been the traditional method applied by Member 
States for implementation of EC law, leading one author to argue that the Commission’s 
proposal for a directive on the protection of the environment through criminal law is 
hence “non-European”18. Moreover Member States still regard criminal law as intrinsic to 
their sovereignty and resist the transfer of their power to legislate in this area to a 
supranational institution. Indeed since criminal law is the most powerful State tool to 
regulate individual liberties, the EU Member States are recalcitrant where matters of 
losing their sovereignty over their criminal laws to Brussels are concerned. It is also 
submitted that the third pillar on judicial co-operation on criminal matters would be the 
                                                
14 Council of Europe Convetion on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law, Strasbourg, 
4.XI. 1998. 
15 The Convention will enter into force after a period following the ratification of three signatory parties to 
the Convention. To date the only signatory party to ratify the Convention is Estonia. The Council’s 
(now annulled) Framework Decision was largely based on the Council of Europe 1998 Convention. 
16 Article 5 EC Treaty 
17 This is the method used for implementation of Directives, which are more widely used in the 
environmental field. Article 249 EC, al.3 reads: “a directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, 
upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of 
forms and methods” (emphasis added). 
 
18 Faure, Michael, ‘European Environmental Criminal Law: Do we really need it?’ [2004] EELR, p. 19. 
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appropriate venue for harmonisation of environmental criminal law19, though the ECJ has 
clearly rejected this argument. 
 
Yet it is not only the constitutional framework of the EU that has led to criticisms of the 
Commission’s initiative to harmonise environmental criminal law. Even though the ECJ 
has consistently held in its case-law interpreting Article 10 EC that Member States must 
introduce sanctions which are “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” for violations of 
EC law20 and that a failure to introduce those sanctions could constitute a violation of EU 
law21, it is not at all clear whether criminal sanctions necessarily meet the requirements of 
dissuasiveness, effectiveness and proportionality. Therefore in order to answer the 
question of whether the harmonisation of environmental criminal law could improve the 
levels of environmental protection in the EU Member States, it is first necessary to 
investigate whether the application of criminal sanctions could have a positive effect on 
the enforcement of EC environmental law and whether civil liability or administrative 
sanctions could not be just as effective as, or perhaps more effective than, criminal 
sanctions.   
  
Specifically, the initial section of this paper discusses the different rationales for the use 
of criminal sanctions in the environmental field. Secondly, the use of alternative 
sanctions (particularly administrative and civil ones) will be discussed. Thirdly, there is 
an analysis of the different approaches in the EU Member states regarding the possibility 
of holding corporations criminally liable. The final and concluding section will examine 
                                                
19 Articles 29, 31 (e) and 34 (2) (b) pursuant to Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. It is questionable 
whether article 31 (e) TEU, which enables the approximation of the constituent elements of criminal acts 
and penalties in the fields of “organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking”, would allow for a 
general competence for the harmonisation of environmental criminal law. Not all environmental offences 
are the product of organised crimes. See Kramer, L. ‘Environment, Crime and EC Law. Case Law 
Analysis’ Journal of Environmental Law [2006] Vol. 18 no.2, p. 285 and Albrecht, Hans-Jorg, ‘The Extent 
of Environmental Crime; A European Perspective’, in Environmental Crime in Europe: Rules of Sanctions, 
Comte, F. and Kramer, L. (e.d.), Europa Law Publishing, (2004). 
20 For the first time in Case 68/88 Commission v Greece ECR 1989, and reiterated in subsequent cases (e.g. 
C-326/88 Hansen ECR 1989). For a discussion of those developments prior to the ECJ decision in case 
176-03, see Comte, F. “Criminal Environmental Law and Community Competence” [2003] EELR 12, 
p. 147.   
21 Case 265/95 Commission v France, Spanish Strawberries [1997] ECR I-6959. 
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whether the harmonisation of environmental criminal law in the first pillar could improve 
the level of environmental protection in the European Union.   
     
II. The use of criminal sanctions for the protection of the environment 
 
Some commentators suggest that criminal law is not the most effective mechanism to 
control environmental wrongdoing22 and some even accuse it of being inherently 
antithetical to environmental law.23  Yet this does not mean that there is a lack of 
theoretical foundation for the use of criminal law for the protection of the environment.  
 
Any political decision to criminalize offences against the environment will invariably be 
based either on (1) utilitarian or (2) retributivist grounds. These are the two main pillars 
designing the contours of any move towards the criminalization of offences. The 
retributivist theory of crime and punishment holds that there is a need to introduce 
criminal sanctions whenever an element of moral culpability in the wrongful act can be 
identified (or ‘just deserts’). On the other hand, utilitarians advocate that the only 
rationale for introducing criminal penalties is the maximisation of society’s welfare under 
a cost-benefit analysis in order to improve deterrence and not simply to punish the 
offender for his past conduct. While the retributivist goal is to punish an offender for his 
or her intrinsically morally wrong behaviour (past-orientated), the utilitarian objective is 
to create a mechanism of punishment that enjoys efficiency in deterring the commission 
of future crimes (future-orientated).  
 
                                                
22 See for example Pagh, Peter, ‘Administrative Criminal Law Systems in Europe: an Asset for the 
Environment?’ in Environmental Crimes in Europe: Rules of Sanctions, p. 163. 
23 Lazarus, Richard, ‘Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law: 
Reforming Environmental Criminal Law’, [1993] 83 Georgetown Law Journal. He argues that three 
characteristics of environmental law would be incompatible with criminal law: 1) its evolutionary 
nature since it is based on moving-targets depending on new scientific evidence, which is incompatible 
with the stability necessary in criminal law 2) its aspirational quality since environmental standards (at 
least in the US context) are arguably set at a very high level in order to ensure at least the minimum 
desired level of compliance 3) its complexity and technicality, making it difficult for judges to have a 
good grasp of environmental legislation (pp. 2424 to 2432).    
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Retributive Notions 
 
Many environmentalists defending the use of criminal sanctions for the protection of the 
environment base their position on retributivist grounds and not necessarily on cost-
benefit analysis. After all, cargo-operators such as that of the Prestige, responsible for an 
oil-spill that caused severe damage to wildlife on the coasts of Spain and France, or the 
smuggler of endangered species who carelessly lets them die in transit, would surely 
deserve penal punishment - so long as they have the necessary mens rea24 - regardless of 
whether or not others would be deterred from committing similar offences in the future. 
Indeed, as the awareness of the public in environmental issues increase, it is likely that 
(serious) environmental offences will not be regarded as mere regulatory offences (or 
‘mala prohibita’) but real crimes (‘mala in se’)25 
 
However since the ultimate aim of environmental law is the protection of ecological 
resources, its role must not only be punishment for the offender’s past-misconduct, but 
primarily that of harm prevention (deterrence).26 Therefore it is on utilitarian grounds that 
some of the more prominent foundations for the criminalisation of environmental 
offences must be read in connection with, namely the welfare principle, the harm 
principle and deterrence.  
 
Utilitarian Notions 
 
According to the welfare principle, the sole basis for criminalisation would be to protect 
collective interests belonging to the whole community (res communis)27. If the call for 
                                                
24 In the UK context, environmental offences are generally regulatory so ‘strict liability’ is the standard of 
mens rea for those offences. See Alphacell v. Woodward [1972] A.C. 824. 
25 Bell, S. and McGuillivray, Environmental Law (6th ed. OUP 2006) p. 281. 
26 Retributivism and utilitarianism do not always need to be seen as antithetical: both objectives can be 
achieved concomitantly. In addition, rehabilitation of the offender and restoration of the natural 
environment are also roles played by the criminal law in the environmental field. 
27 Ashworth, Andrew. Principles of Criminal Law (5th edition OUP 2006) p.28.  
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criminalisation is solely based on moral grounds and falls outside the sphere of public 
interest (such as the criminal punishment of the adulterous wife or for those who 
committed bigamy) then criminal law should be put aside. Significantly, environmental 
protection tends to be identified as a third generation right, reflecting communal values 
and interests that cannot be divided or singularised. In this context, the welfare principle 
seems to be an important philosophical foundation for the criminalization of 
environmental offences.  
 
However it is the harm principle that has been more widely debated as a possible 
philosophical basis for the criminalisation of environmental offences. John Stuart Mill, 
one of the fathers of utilitarianism, has famously written that “the only purpose for which 
power can be rightly exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others.”28 This statement is one of the earliest formulations of 
the harm principle, under which criminal legislation could only be introduced in order to 
protect others from harm. Therefore, those human acts that do not have the potential of 
causing harm to others (such as homosexual acts in private) could not be criminalized 
since any objection to them would be merely based on moral grounds. The objective of 
the application of the harm principle is thus to secure moral neutrality.  
 
Controversially, Joel Feinberg argues that the harm principle does not apply in the case of 
environmental pollution since, as an accumulative harm, it is impossible to determine the 
degree of contribution of each polluter for the harm29. To illustrate his proposition, he 
argues that it would be impossible to individualise the degree of contribution of each 
motor vehicle for the air pollution caused by the discharge of carbon dioxide from its 
turbines. It then becomes impossible to assign responsibility to each offender.   
 
                                                
28 J. S. Mill, On Liberty, Ch. 5, quoted in Ashworth, A. Principles of Criminal Law, (4th ed. OUP 2003) p. 
32. 
29 Feinberg, Joel. The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Others (OUP USA 1984) p. 227. 
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Another approach would be to regard the responsibility in such cases as shared and 
independent of the identification of specific offenders.30 Also, many jurisdictions appear 
to have circumvented any limitations to the harm principle by recognising types of 
endangerment offences which are independent of actual harm as long as there is potential 
for harm. In contrast to ‘real crimes’, which relate to the commission of, or attempt to 
commit, a real harm, regulatory crimes are abstract endangerment offences that require 
the mere potential of causing harm31.  Therefore, the breach of pollution emission 
standards by industrial enterprises could be a regulatory crime regardless of whether or 
not any real harm to the environment has occurred.32  
 
Criminal sanctions and deterrence 
 
Since for utilitarianism the main goal of the criminal law is deterrence, this paper will 
turn to the discussion of the deterrent effects of criminal sanctions. There are two forms 
of deterrence: specific deterrence, which applies to individual offenders; and general 
deterrence, which applies to the general public. Hence the objectives of deterrence 
policies are twofold: to stop the individual offender from committing further crimes 
(either by fear of punishment or by incapacitation in the case of incarceration), or to 
prevent the general public from committing crimes after the exemplary punishment 
system has been introduced and applied. The existence of deterrence arising from the 
introduction of criminal punishment has been proved in more recent criminological 
studies, particularly in those carried out in the context of drink driving or the use of 
seatbelt in private cars33.   
                                                
30 The Law Reform Commission of Canada has embraced this view. The Law Reform Commission of 
Canada, "Sentencing in Environmental Cases" (1986). 
31 Rowan-Robinson J., Watchman P., and Barker C., Crime and Regulation: A Study of the Enforcement of 
Regulatory Codes (T&T Clark 1990), p. 205.  
 
32 Wells, Celia. Corporations and Criminal Responsibility, Oxford (2001). “health and safety offences (…) 
do not refer to the result which the unguarded machine might endanger, they prohibit the failure to guard” 
p. 5.   
 
33 Von Hirsch, Andrew. Criminal Deterrence and Sentence Severity: an Analysis of Recent Research. 
Oxford: Hard, 2000 p. 47. But no conclusive studies have been able to prove marginal deterrence, that 
is, how much extra deterrence is achieved by increasing the certainty (e.g. improving policing) or 
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However, in a study commissioned by the European Commission on the criminal 
enforcement of environmental law in the EU Member States34  it was found, based on the 
answers to a questionnaire sent to national experts, that from the strict point of view of 
deterrence, administrative sanctions would seem to work as effectively as criminal ones. 
Since fines are the sanctions most often applied either by the administrative agencies or 
courts for environmental offences in the EU, it could be argued that:  
 
“other things being equal, (…) if only monetary sanctions were to be imposed, 
administrative sanctions could do as good a job as criminal sanctions and probably at 
more speedily and at lower cost, since usually the procedural requirements in 
administrative legal procedures are lower than in the criminal procedure”.35  
 
Even though criminal fines are reported to be more commonly applied in criminal 
proceedings relating to environmental offences, one must look beyond the sanctions that 
are actually applied in practice. Unlike civil and administrative law, the arsenal of 
sanctions available in criminal law may include the threat of incarceration, which 
provides a strong incentive for compliance with environmental regulations. In that regard, 
the new proposal of the Commission for a directive of February 2007 on the protection of 
the environment through criminal law substantially improves the text of a previous 
proposal of March 2001 in so far as it attaches specific criminal sanctions to be applied 
by Member States for serious breaches of EC environmental law. Unlike the 2001 
proposal which contained a general, non-specific provision on sanctions stating that 
                                                                                                                                            
severity (sentencing levels) of punishment, though current research does indicate that there are 
consistent and significant negative correlations between likelihood of conviction and crime rates. 
34 Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Law in the European Union, IMPEL Network, Report by 
Michael Faure and Gunter Heine, Metro, July 2000 (this study only applied to the EU15 countries) 
Since a great part of the activities involving environmental pollution are also socially useful, the 
objective sought by law is not total deterrence but optimal deterrence. For the environmental criminal 
enforcement in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia, see Study on Criminal 
Penalties in a Few Candidate Countries’ Environmental Law, Final Report, October 2003, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/crime/pdf/criminal_pen_vol1.pdf  
35 Ibid p .82. 
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Member States must in serious cases of violations of EC environmental law (referred to 
in article 3 of the proposal) introduce the sanction of imprisonment36, the new proposal 
requires Member States to attach the sanction of imprisonment (with specific terms of 
imprisonment) to those serious cases of violation specified in the directive37. However, 
the Commission’s interpretation of the ECJ decision in case 176-03 may have been too 
wide38. Even though the ECJ recognised that the Community has a limited competence in 
criminal matters (that is, to require Member States to introduce criminal sanctions against 
serious violations of environmental law), it has fallen short of creating an EC competence 
to create specific offences or to attach specific sanctions to those offences39, and a final 
answer as to whether the Community has the power to do so will be pending until the 
ECJ decision in the Ship-Source Pollution case40, in which the Commission, following 
the ECJ decision in Case 176/03, challenges the legal basis of a Framework Decision of 
the Council of July 2005 to strengthen the criminal-law for the enforcement of the law 
against ship-source pollution adopted under the third pillar41. That said, it is difficult to 
imagine how the Community would be able to ensure that the criminal sanctions applied 
by Member States are “effective, dissuasive and proportionate”, if a certain level-playing 
field in relation to the level of those sanctions is not established at the Community level. 
                                                
36 2001/0076 (COD) article 4, a). 
37 2007/0022 (COD) article 5. 
38 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council on the Implications 
of the Court’s judgement of 13 September 2005 (Case C-176/03 Commission v Council) COM (2005) 
583. The Commission holds that “… the judgement lays down principles going far beyond the case in 
question. The same arguments can be applied in their entirety to the other common policies and to the 
four freedoms (freedom of movement of persons, goods, services and capital) (paragraph 6) This 
approach is followed in Advocate General Mazák’s opinion in Case-440/05 (pending), see in particular 
points 97 and 98. 
39 See 42nd Report of Session 2005-06, European Union Committee, House of Lords, “The Criminal Law 
Competence of the European Community: Report with Evidence” 28 July 2006. 
40 Case C-440/05 (pending). The ECJ ruled in paragraph 53 of the 176-03 case that “the entire framework 
decision, being indivisible, infringes Article 47 EU as it encroaches on the powers which Article 175 EC 
confers on the Community” (emphasis added). Therefore the Court was cautious to point out that not all 
areas covered by the Framework Decision (possibly including the competence to create specific offences 
and penalties) belong to the first pillar.  
41 Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA of 12 July 2005 adopted under Title VI of the TEU. 
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Yet in his opinion in Case-440/05 delivered on 28 June 2007, Advocate General Mazák is 
of the view that the establishment of specific offences and penalties would be better 
achieved by the Member States themselves (either acting individually or jointly under the 
inter-governmental, or third pillar, level)  in order to maintain the coherence of each 
national penal system.42  
 
The following section will continue to examine the role of deterrence in criminal law in 
connection with its role in relation to other types of sanctions, particularly civil and 
administrative ones. 
 
III. The use of alternative sanctions to the protection of the environment through 
criminal law 
 
The European Commission argues in its proposal for a directive that only criminal 
sanctions would have the desired deterrent effect for the effective enforcement of EC 
environmental law43. This view is not shared by some commentators who argue that civil 
liability and administrative sanctions could provide a similar degree of deterrence to 
criminal sanctions, and at lower costs to society.44    
 
It is argued that the costs pertinent to criminal proceedings and investigation and the high 
evidentiary burden in criminal cases suggests that criminal law would not be the most 
effective way to combat environmental crimes. Unlike in the UK, where administrative 
agencies do not generally have sanctioning powers45, many other European countries 
                                                
42 See points 103 to 113. In point 108 he also cites the subsidiarity principle in support of this argument.  
His view is in line with that of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case 176/03, points 83 to 87, but 
this issue was however not examined by the ECJ in that case. Their view is not in line with the approach 
taken by the Constitutional Treaty which allows the Community to establish specific offences and penalties 
to ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy [Article III-271 (2)]. 
 
43 Explanatory Memorandum, 2007/0022 (COD) p.2. 
44 See for example Pagh, above n. 22. 
45 In his advice to the British government in relation to corporate regulatory non-compliance, Richard 
Macrory called for sanctioning powers to be given to regulators in the case of non serious violations, 
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apply administrative sanctions in the environmental field (e.g. the Netherlands mainly 
applies administrative sanctions).  
  
Administrative and Civil v. Criminal Sanctions  
 
The main regulatory body in Member States in the environmental field – e.g. the 
Environment Agency - has the technical expertise to investigate and, when appropriate, to 
bring an administrative action or prosecution for alleged breaches of environmental law. 
This technical expertise is lacking in the courts. The range of sanctions that can be 
applied by those regulatory bodies, which includes the revocation of licences to operate, 
the payment of very high fines, or the shutdown of an installation, can arguably be as 
powerful a deterrent as criminal sanctions. The revocation of a licence to operate or the 
shutdown of an installation, in particular, are extremely serious and are equivalent to the 
corporate ‘death sentence’. Some of those sanctions are criminal (repressive) in nature 
and are sometimes called quasi-criminal sanctions (Ordnungwidrigkeiten)46. The agencies 
may apply those sanctions themselves without the need of recourse to a court, the rules of 
administrative procedure are simplified and the case can thus be handled more speedily 
and effectively.  As regards civil law many jurisdictions accept the application of punitive 
damages in civil cases which can effectively raise the damage awards to a level that could 
even drive corporations out of business.47 Therefore the effective application of both 
administrative and civil sanctions would seem sufficient to ensure compliance with 
environmental regulations without the need for criminal sanctions. This is one of the 
reasons for some Member States, especially those that have been applying a more flexible 
                                                                                                                                            
instead of heavy reliance on criminal prosecutions which is the current practice. Macrory, R. 
“Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions Effective” Final Report, November 2006. available at  
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/regulation/documents/pdf/macrory_penalties.pdf hereinafter ‘Macrory 
Report’. 
46 Austria and Germany for example apply those “repressive fines” in their legal systems. Even though 
those countries do not recognise the criminal liability of corporations, they may apply those repressive 
sanctions against them. 
47 See Cohen, A. Mark, ‘Criminal Law: Environmental Crime and Punishment: :Legal/Economic Theory 
and Empirical Evidence on Enforcement of Federal Environmental Statutes’ [1992] 82 Journal of 
Criminal Law & Criminology. 
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approach to the enforcement of environmental regulations (such as the Netherlands), to 
remain recalcitrant where environmental criminal law is concerned48.    
 
However, it must be remembered that the ECJ developed a threefold requirement for 
sanctions: they must be “dissuasive, effective, and proportionate”49. Even though, as has 
been argued, administrative and civil law could be effective and, possibly even, 
dissuasive enough, one must take account of the requirement that sanctions must be 
proportional to the offence. Severe administrative sanctions, for example the revocation 
of licences to operate, the payment of very high fines, or the shutdown of an installation, 
could be challenged on this basis50. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held 
that in such cases the sanction could be considered criminal in nature and would therefore 
require the procedural guarantees of Article 6 ECHR51. The Court applies the following 
criteria when deciding whether a sanction is “criminal in nature”: 1) Does the text 
defining the offence belong to criminal law? 2) the nature of the offence 3) the nature and 
severity of the penalty that the person concerned risked incurring, having regard to the 
object and nature of Article 652. The ECtHR is thus prepared to consider certain 
                                                
48 Study on Measures other than Criminal Ones in Cases where Environmental Community law has not 
been respected in the EU Member States, Summary Report. September 2004. On the other hand, in the UK, 
Ireland and Denmark the administrative agencies do not have the power to apply sanctions, so 
infringements of environmental regulations are adjudicated by a criminal court. Available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/crime/pdf/ms_summary_report.pdf 
49 See for example Commission v Greece C-68/88 ECR 1989 and C-326/88 Hansen ECR 1989. 
50 In the UK the Environment Agency has not very frequently sought to apply those serious sanctions for 
environmental offences. Regarding waste management licences, there were only 37 revocations 
between 1996-2003 and in some cases the revocation was because the licence holder had ceased to 
exist or failed to pay fees.  Bell, S. and McGuillivray, D., above n. 25, p. 305.    
51 Özturk v. Germany (Application no. 8544/79), European Court of Human Rights, 1984, available at 
echr.coe.int. The Court stated that “if the Contracting States were able at their discretion, by 
classifying an offence as "regulatory" instead of criminal, to exclude the operation of the fundamental 
clauses of Articles 6 and 7 (art. 6, art. 7), the application of these provisions would be subordinated to 
their sovereign will.  A latitude extending thus far might lead to results incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the Convention”. (Par. 49) See also “Study on Measures other than Criminal Ones in 
Cases where Environmental Community Law has not been Respected in the EU Member States”, 
above n. 48, p. 14. 
52 Engel and others v the Netherlands [1976] ECHR, paragraph 82. This test was replicated in the Özturk 
case, supra. 
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regulatory or disciplinary offences as “criminal in nature” depending on the seriousness 
of the offence and the nature or severity of the sanction applicable. Therefore the 
decriminalisation of certain types of serious environmental offences, or the application of 
heavy penalties under the administrative procedural law of the states members of the 
Council of Europe, could be held to contravene Article 6 of the Convention53. It is clear 
that the Court wishes to strike a balance between effectively applying administrative 
sanctions on the one hand, and the need of observing the rules of fair trial, the rule of law 
and other procedural guarantees of the accused on the other.   
 
Another fundamental aspect of administrative law, which sets it in contrast with criminal 
or civil law, is that there is no separation between the authorities entitled to issue 
administrative permits or licences, and the enforcement and sanctioning roles. Therefore 
the authority that issues the permit or licence (executive powers) is the same as the one 
responsible for adjudication of disputes, which raises questions regarding the impartiality 
of those authorities. What is more, the authority who investigates environmental crimes is 
also the one that applies the penalties.54 A corollary of this lack of separation of powers is 
that the regulatory agencies can become ‘captured by’ the industries they intend to 
regulate55. Corruption remains a very relevant issue.  
 
Criminal law has an additional procedural guarantee which is the possibility of public 
participation in court proceedings56. That is not the case in the administrative and civil 
law systems which involve proceedings closed to the public. Closed proceedings lack the 
                                                
53   See paragraph 49 of Özturk, above n. 51, where the Court stated that “The Convention is not opposed to 
States, in the performance of their task as guardians of the public interest, both creating or 
maintaining a distinction between different categories of offences for the purposes of their domestic 
law and drawing the dividing line, but it does not follow that the classification thus made by the States 
is decisive for the purposes of the Convention.”  
54  “Study on Measures other than Criminal Ones in Cases where Environmental Community Law has not 
been Respected in the EU Member States”, above n. 48, p. 52. 
55 Lee, M.. EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Change and Decision-Making, Hart Publishing, (2005) p. 
53. 
56 “Study on Measures other than Criminal Ones Environmental Community Law has not been Respected 
in the EU Member States”, above n. 48, p. 58. 
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necessary transparency that would be required in cases of serious breaches of 
environmental law and where the defendants may face heavy penalties. This has an 
additional shortcoming in the case of corporations, which are particularly sensitive to 
naming and shaming, since closed proceedings could diminish their incentive for 
compliance. Indeed, the stigma of the offender, one crucial element in the deterrence 
theory, is absent when the public is not able to participate in the proceedings.57 
 
As regards civil law the main criticism is that it depends on the injured parties to bring a 
claim for compensation, therefore leaving the environment as such unprotected. A 
polluted atmosphere or a dead fish does not have standing to bring court cases – it 
requires sympathetic individual humans or typically, charities, to act58.  Not in all legal 
systems civil law allows the use of the public apparatus for the investigation of an offence 
in relation to a claim for monetary compensation. Therefore civil law alone is not 
effective in deterring offenders.59 
 
For all the reasons alluded to above it is suggested that criminal sanctions are necessary 
in the environmental field. Not necessarily because criminal sanctions are more effective 
or dissuasive than civil or administrative ones, but because in the case of serious breaches 
of environmental law, the response of the state must be to impose a serious sanction (in 
line with the “fair labelling” principle60). The application of this serious sanction calls for 
                                                
57 Yet in the UK context, Richard Macrory argued in relation to the stigma of criminal sanctions that 
“Criminal convictions for regulatory non-compliance have lost their stigma, as in some industries, 
being prosecuted is regarded as part of the business cycle. This may be because both strict liability 
offences committed by legitimate business, and the deliberate flouting of the law by rogues is 
prosecuted in the same manner with little differentiation between these two types of offender” above 
‘Macrory Report’ n. 45, p. 16. 
58 The 1998 Aarhus Convention is considered a champion in relation to establishing a right to access to 
justice in national courts to non-state actors in environmental matters.  
59 But see Dir 2004/35 on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of 
Environmental Damage [2004] OJ L 143/56. The new Environmental Civil Liability Directive 
represents a move away from an emphasis on monetary compensation, to preventive or remedial action 
aimed at rectifying actual or threatened environmental damage, and from private enforcement to the 
enforcement role placed on competent authorities. See Hedemann-Robinson, M. Enforcement of 
European Union Environmental Law: Legal Issues and Challenges, Routledge-Cavendish, 2006, 
p.514. 
60 See Ashworth, above n. 28, p. 88. 
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all the necessary procedural guarantees to the defendant to be present, which are 
generally lacking in the case of civil and administrative procedures. Clearly this does not 
necessarily mean better protection for the environment. Therefore it is necessary that all 
sanctions (criminal, administrative and civil) are applied in the environmental field and 
only serious violations should be criminalised - criminal law as a ultimum remedium. As 
was put in the IMPEL Network Report: 
 
“The central question is not so much whether a legal system should choose either for 
administrative or criminal law protection of the environment, but more like how a 
correct balance between the two systems can be struck.”61  
 
This approach ensures that prosecutions are not trivialised and the role of the criminal 
law as a threat system62 is maintained. If the main role of criminal law in the 
environmental field is deterrence, that aspect may be worth the cost of using less efficient 
criminal prosecutions63. In this sense, the Commission’s proposal for a directive is correct 
in only envisaging criminal sanctions for the more serious breaches of environmental law 
committed intentionally or with serious negligence, yet reserving to Member States the 
option of adopting stricter standards (e.g. strict liability).      
IV. Corporate Criminal Liability in the EU Member States 
 
One of the areas in which Member States have significantly divergent approaches is in 
regard to the possibility of holding corporations themselves criminally liable, as opposed 
to their directors, managers and employees. Since corporations are the main polluters and 
                                                
61 IMPEL Network Report, above n. 34, p. 85. 
62 See van den Haag, Ernest, ‘The Criminal law as a Threat System’, [1982] The Journal of Criminal Law 
& Criminology vol. 73 n 2. 
63 The Commission also considers that the higher costs involved in criminal prosecutions than in 
administrative ones is not itself a disadvantage, since there may be fewer violations of environmental 
law and therefore fewer proceedings because of the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions. See 
Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying document to the proposal for a Directive on the 
Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law: Impact Assessment, COM (2007) 51 SEC 
(2007) 161, hereinafter “2007 Directive Impact Assessment” p. 31. 
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are, in fact, responsible for the majority of environmental crimes,64 the issue of corporate 
criminal liability is a crucial one to consider.  
 
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are familiar with the 
criminal liability of corporate entities65. The reasoning behind the defence of the value of 
corporate criminal liability is primarily twofold: one reason is pragmatic, since the work 
of the prosecution is facilitated by not having to single out the individuals responsible for 
the crime inside the corporation or to prove their mens rea – the sanction is applied 
against the corporation itself66. The other reason would be that crimes committed by 
company directors and employees should be attributed to the corporation as a whole, 
since generally there must have been an element of organisational or systematic failure67 
to prevent the crime from happening in the first place. It thus requires that companies 
introduce preventive mechanisms to control and prevent violations of criminal law.   
 
Nevertheless the corporation clearly has “no body to kick or soul to damn”68 and only in 
legal fiction it would be possible to hold corporations criminally liable, so it was not until 
the 1970s that the House of Lords famously developed the identification theory 69 (or 
“alter ego” theory) in the Tesco Supermarkets case.70 In this case, the House of Lords 
held that only high ranking corporate officials (“the directing mind” of the company) 
could trigger the criminal liability of the corporation as whole. The legal principle 
                                                
64 Situ, Y. and Emmons, D., Environmental Crime: The Criminal Justice System’s Role in Protecting the 
Environment (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2000) p.4. Yet they point out that certain industries are more 
likely to commit environmental crimes, for example oil companies and the chemical and petrochemical 
industries. 
65 IMPEL Network Report, above n. 34, p. 15. 
66 Dine, J. and Koutsias, M. Company Law (6th ed. Palgrave 2007) p. 40. 
67 F McAuley and J. P. McCutcheon, Criminal Liability, Dublin (2000) p. 379.   
68 Coffee, John, ‘“No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: an Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of 
Corporate Punishment’ [1981] Michigan Law Review, 79 at 386. 
69 The identification theory was “created” by the opinion of Viscount Haldane in Lennard’s Carrying Co 
Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC.  
70 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Natrass (1972) AC 153. 
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developed had the effect of equating the actions of the company’s top officials to actions 
of the company itself, since “the state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of 
the company and should be treated by law as such.”71 
 
The approach of the House of Lords was however quite restrictive. It was held that only 
the conduct of the “board of directors, the managing director and perhaps other superior 
officers” could trigger corporate liability72. This has become known as the “controlling 
officer” test, and it can be criticised for the prosecutorial difficulties involved in 
achieving a successful conviction of companies – indeed, it will entail a great deal of 
effort for the prosecution to investigate the degree of fault that may be attributed to senior 
managers, especially given that their actions are not normally under the supervision of 
others73. This problem is further complicated, as Coffee points out, since “in the modern 
decentralised firm, with operations spanning continents and a range of markets, 
decisions about whether or not to obey the criminal law may be made at all levels”74 
Coffee also argues that the identification theory is particularly unhelpful in triggering the 
liability of corporations in relation to environmental crimes, pointing out that in modern 
firms with decentralised decision-making, the decision to commit environmental offences 
occurs principally at the middle to lower management levels75. In fact, corporate directors 
tend to decentralise or delegate decision-making to lower management levels specifically 
in order to prevent themselves, as well as the corporation, from being subjected to 
criminal prosecution. Yet Coffee’s argument may not apply in the case of 
environmentally-sensitive industries (for example the pulp or waste transport industries) 
where decisions that directly affect the environment are frequently made at the higher 
managerial levels.  
                                                
71 HL Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd v T.J Graham & Sons Ltd. [1957] 1QB 159 at 172. 
72 Tesco Supermarkets, above n. 70. 
73 Slapper, Gary and Tombs, Steve. Corporate Crimes (Longman, 1999) p. 31. 
74 John Coffee, “Corporate Criminal Liability: an Introduction and Comparative Survey” in Criminal 
Responsibility of Legal and Collective Entities, Max Planck Institute, 1999 pgs. 16/17. 
75 “chief executive officers simply are not organisationally positioned to make fast-paced decisions as to 
whether to pollute local streams or gateways, or release pollutants into the air, or otherwise 
environmental rules or regulations” Ibid. 
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In continental Europe, while the Netherlands followed the UK’s approach in 1976, 
Finland did not recognise the criminal liability of corporations until 1995. France has 
started to apply corporate criminal sanctions since 199476 with the reform of its 
Napoleonic Criminal Code, though its initial approach was only to allow the liability of 
corporations if each criminal provision explicitly stated that it applied to corporations. 
The more modern approach is to consider a corporation criminally liable if an element of 
organisational or systematic failure of the corporation can be identified, regardless of the 
attribution of individual fault77. This alternative overcomes some of the evidentiary 
difficulties of the English “controlling officer” test. 
 
The other EU countries surveyed by the Commission adhere to the principle of “societas 
delinquere non potest” but, as mentioned above, they have established other forms of 
sanctioning enterprises. For example Austria has since 1987 adopted a special provision 
in its penal code that enables the application of criminal sanctions against legal persons: 
confiscating illegal profits78. In its turn, Sweden applies a corporate fine as an extra 
sanction, which can be imposed on legal persons in the case of a crime with gross 
violation of entrepreneurial duties79. In Germany, corporations may be compelled to pay 
administrative fines (Geldbussen) if there is a breach of certain administrative regulations 
(Ordnungwidrigkeiten). This system of administrative criminal law is also applied by 
other EU countries, such as Portugal and Austria. 
 
Both the previous March 2001 and the more recent February 2007 Commission proposals 
for a directive on the protection of the environment through criminal law fall short of 
envisaging a mandatory requirement on Member States to introduce criminal sanctions 
                                                
76 French Nouveau Code Pénal (1994). 
77 In Australia, the concept of a “corporate culture” that instigates the commission of crimes may trigger the 
criminal liability of corporations. See Coffee, above n. 74. 
78 IMPEL Network Report, above n. 34, p. 15. 
79 Ibid. 
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against corporations80. So the Commission would allow Member States to retain their 
restrictive approaches if otherwise they would need to bring about fundamental changes 
to their legal system.81 One commentator suggested that this shows that the Commission 
may lack faith in the use of criminal sanctions.82 It is certainly true that it has not yet been 
proved that corporate criminal liability (as opposed to holding the corporation’s 
managers, employees or shareholders themselves criminally liable)83 could not be just as 
effective as - or more effective than - criminal law in controlling corporate behaviour. It 
is also contended that other systems for sanctioning corporations, for example civil law, 
might be more effective than criminal law.84 Yet if the Commission aims to consistently 
harmonise environmental criminal law in Member States such disparate approaches in 
relation to corporate liability would also need to be approximated.85  
 
This problem is partially circumvented with the new proposal for a directive which 
foresees specific levels of fines (not necessarily criminal) for serious environmental 
offences committed by corporations. However, as suggested there are some practical 
implications should one Member State decide to introduce an administrative €1.500.000 
fine and another a criminal €1.500.000 fine86 for the same offence, for example. Since 
                                                
80 Those proposals followed the same approach of the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of 
the Environment through Criminal Law, article 9, par. 3. 
81 Explanatory Memorandum, COM (2007) 0022, p. 8.  
82 Faure, M., above n. 18, p. 23. 
83 Individualists argue that criminal sanctions provide a strong deterrent if applied against the company’s 
managers, employees or shareholders, rather than the corporation itself. 
84 See Khanna, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability: What purpose does it serve?’ [1996] Harvard Law Review 
1109, 477. He argues that civil corporate liability would be more effective than criminal.      
85 For a different view see Martin Hedemman-Robinson, who argues that the individual criminal liability of 
the company’s directors, managers and employees would provide sufficient deterrent. Enforcement of 
European Union Environmental Law: Legal Issues and Challenges, Routledge-Cavendish, 2006. 
86 In order to be effective fines must be calculated taking into account the seriousness of the offence and the 
likelihood of detection. The maximum fine envisaged in the February 2007 proposal for a directive for 
certain environmental crimes committed intentionally and that causes death or serious injury of a 
person is €1.500.000. It is generally recognised that low fines are applied by the courts in 
environmental cases. Even though over-deterrence through very heavy could be seen as counter-
productive in the case of socially and economically useful activities, fines must be to a high level that it 
cannot be simply a cost of doing business. As shown in the ‘Macrory Report’, the largest fine handed 
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very high fines might potentially drive corporations out of business, this would call for 
stronger procedural guarantees than are found in administrative procedure. This problem 
is further complicated by the fact that the grounds for judicial review of administrative 
decisions can be very limited in some jurisdictions, which means that the defendant might 
not ultimately have access to a Court and to all the procedural guarantees available in 
Court proceedings87. Yet it is likely that all things being equal corporations would still 
prefer an administrative fine (despite the lower procedural guarantees of the 
administrative procedure) than a criminal one, due to the stronger stigma and higher 
publicity attached to a criminal prosecution, not to mention the corporate power to 
‘influence’ administrative decisions. Therefore the implementation by Member States of 
Article 7 of the new proposal for a directive will not necessarily mean that sanctions 
against corporations would be evenly applied or that they will have similar deterrent 
effects, for similar environmental crimes within the EU. 
 
If the Commission wishes to take the problem of corporate environmental crimes 
seriously, criminal sanctions would need to be imposed on corporations themselves. This 
is not to rule out the possibility of also holding the corporation’s managers, employees 
and shareholders criminally liable. Yet the difficulties in identifying who the agents 
responsible for the crime are, and the tendency of corporations to harbour those agents or 
to conceal the crime, means that prosecutions might not be effective unless the 
corporation itself is held responsible. Thus, in order to ensure the effective application of 
criminal sanctions in the corporate context, the EU Member States could be required to 
recognise the criminal responsibility of corporations and that the identification of an 
element of organisational or systemic failure in the corporation would be sufficient to 
trigger its criminal liability, regardless of the individual fault of any of its managers or 
                                                                                                                                            
down for a health and safety offence in the UK was £15 million. Even though it was high in absolute 
terms, it represented five percent of after-tax profits and less than one per cent of annual revenues of 
the company. See above n. 45, p.21.  
87 In the UK the grounds for judicial review of administrative decisions are a) illegality b) irrationality and 
c) procedural impropriety. Procedural impropriety would not seem to cover the lower procedural 
guarantees in administrative procedure if the authorities acted within the limits permitted by law. 
Judicial Review: A Short Guide to Claims in the Administrative Court, House of Commons, Research 
Paper 0644, 2006, available at  http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2006/rp06-044.pdf 
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employees88. But since many EU member states still do not apply criminal sanctions 
against corporations, it is understandable that the Commission is hesitant to push Member 
States to adopt such radical reforms.     
 
V. Could the harmonisation of environmental criminal law improve the levels of 
environmental protection in the EU?89 
 
The ECJ decision of 13 September 2005 in Case 176/03 has finally established that even 
though the Community does not have competence in criminal matters as such, the 
Community institutions may require Member States to introduce criminal sanctions in the 
implementation of EC environmental legislation90. This is in line with the case-law of the 
ECJ establishing that Member States must introduce sanctions which are dissuasive, 
                                                
88 The US applies a system of vicarious liability and an act by an employee may trigger the criminal 
liability of the corporation.   
89 Even though the focus of this paper is on the European Union context, there is a scope for the 
harmonisation of environmental criminal law at the international level. Several international 
conventions on the protection of the environment contain “penal clauses” (e.g. Basel and CITES), but 
there are obvious difficulties in securing the enforcement of those obligations under those international 
conventions. The Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders in Havana, 1990, the importance of introducing criminal sanctions for the protection of the 
environment was highlighted in Resolution 45/121 of 14 December 1990. Also article 26 of the 1954 
International Law Commission’s (ILC) Draft Code of Offences Against Peace and Security of 
Mankind deals with environmental crimes; article 19 (3) (d) adds that “a serious breach of an 
international obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding and preservation of the human 
environment” could constitute an international crime, such as “massive pollution of the atmosphere 
and the high seas.” Some commentators have then argued that international environmental crimes 
(sometimes referred to as ‘ecocide’) must be introduced to the Rome Statute as part of the International 
Criminal Court’s jurisdiction. See e.g. Mark Gray, ‘The International Crime of Ecocide’ (1996) 
California Western International Law Journal 26. 
90   Commission v Council C-176/03 [2005] ECR I – 7879, paragraphs 47 and 48. Despite the 
Commission’s wide interpretation of the ECJ decision, most Member States have only been prepared 
to accept its application to the environmental field. In its November 2005 Communication, the 
Commission inferred from the judgement a general competence to harmonise criminal law in many 
other EU policy-areas, and has been of the position that at least other eleven first and third pillar 
instruments have been adopted under the wrong legal basis (Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament and the Council on the implications of the Court’s judgment of 13 September 
2005, Brussels COM (2005) 583. Even though a final answer to this question is expected to be 
answered by the ECJ in the Ship-Source Pollution case, it would be difficult to argue against 
Community competence in criminal matters at least in the case of the other “essential objectives” of the 
Community set out in articles 2 and 3 EC. The Commission’s position on this point was held to be 
correct by Advocate General Mazák in Case-440/05 (pending), see in particular points 97 and 98. 
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effective and proportionate91. The Court has therefore annulled a framework decision of 
the Council on the protection of the environment through criminal law under the third 
pillar. As a consequence of that judgment the Commission has adopted a new proposal 
for a directive on the protection of the environment through criminal law under the first 
pillar in February 200792. Even though after this ruling it is clear that the Community has 
a limited competence in criminal matters - that is, in so far as requiring Member States to 
introduce criminal sanctions for the protection of the environment in the EU Member 
States93 - it remains to be seen whether the Council and Parliament will finally adopt, 
under the co-decision procedure94, the Commission’s proposal. It is also possible that this 
proposal for a directive will not survive the ECJ’s ruling in the Ship-Source Pollution 
case95, in which the Court is expected to rule on the question of whether the Community 
has competence to establish specific criminal offences or penalties96. 
 
Nevertheless, it is not only the institutional aspects of the Community’s competence in 
criminal matters which are the cause of controversy. A further point of controversy has 
already been discussed, that is, whether criminal sanctions are effective or necessary in 
the environmental field. A second controversial question to be answered is whether the 
harmonisation of those environmental criminal sanctions could lead to the improvement 
of environmental protection in the EU. In the Report of an International Meeting of 
                                                
91 See footnote 20 above. 
92 2007/0022 (COD). 
93 The March 2001 proposal for a directive referred to an annex of several pieces of EC environmental 
legislations for which Member States would need to introduce criminal sanctions in their legal systems. 
The February 2007 proposal, following of the same approach of the 1998 Council of Europe 
Convention and the Council’s annulled 2003 Framework Decision, establishes specific environmental 
offences which are not necessarily violations of EC environmental law, but violations of national 
environmental law.   
94 Legislative measures under article 175 require co-decision procedure, giving the Parliament stronger 
powers in decision-making. The co-decision procedure was introduced by the TEU and the procedure 
was simplified under the Treaty of Amsterdam 1999. 
95 Case C-440/05 (pending). 
96 See the House of Lords 42nd Report of Session 2005-06, European Union Committee, “The Criminal 
Law Competence of the European Community: Report with Evidence” 28 July 2006. 
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Experts on the use of criminal sanctions for the protection of the environment 
(domestically, regionally and internationally) that took place in Portland, Oregon, United 
States in March 199497, the advantages of regionalisation of criminal sanctions for the 
protection of the environment were found to be: 
 
a) the likelihood of being able to reach agreement on common definitions of the 
elements of the offences 
b) the greater deterrent effect in relation to transboundary conduct 
c) the contribution towards achieving greater consistency in legal provisions; and 
d) the existence of regional extradition and mutual assistance in criminal matters 
arrangements which could contribute to effective investigation and prosecution 
 
Point a) implies that it is easier to achieve harmonisation at the regional than at the 
international level, where agreement on the common definitions of the elements of the 
offences is less likely to be found. Points b) and c) are closely related: if there is greater 
consistency among the legal provisions of the Member States, it will be more difficult for 
eco-criminals to cross borders and remain unaffected. Point d) is extremely important in 
so far as it relates to the effective investigation and prosecution of crimes, but this is a 
matter that can be properly dealt with under the third pillar (intergovernmental) of the 
European Union98 
 
The Commission itself identifies two main advantages it claims may ensue from the 
harmonisation of environmental criminal law under the first pillar: 1) the improvement of 
                                                
97 The Report can be found in the website of the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform & Criminal 
Justice Policy at the University of British Columbia at the following link: 
http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/Portland2.PDF 
98 The Commission acknowledges that certain matters, such as extradition agreements, still belong to the 
third pillar competence. See for example the Commission’s 2003 proposal for a Framework Decision 
on ship-source pollution, which the Commission adopted to complement its proposal for a directive on 
ship-source pollution. See Comte, F. ‘Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law: Destiny of 
the Various European Union’s Initiatives’ in Europe and the Environment ed. Marco Odina (2004) p. 
43. 
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the implementation deficit of EC environmental law 2) the creation of a level-playing 
field which would prevent some countries from becoming ‘environmental crime havens’. 
 
The implementation deficit of EC environmental law 
 
According to Article 1 of the 2007 Proposal for a Directive, the purpose of the directive is 
to ensure a more effective application of Community law on the protection of the 
environment. The lack of satisfactory implementation of EU environmental law was one 
of the facts that triggered the Commission’s proposal. In the explanatory memorandum it 
states that: 
  
“Experience has shown that the sanctions currently established by the member states 
are not always sufficient to achieve full compliance with Community law. Not all 
member states provide for criminal sanctions against the most serious breaches of 
Community law protecting the environment”.99  
 
Françoise Comte points out that in 2001, complaints for infringements of EC 
environmental law amounted to over a third of the total number of complaints and 
infringement cases that the Commission handles each year.100 The Fourth Annual Survey 
on the implementation and enforcement of Community environmental law (2002)101 also 
shows that in 2002 complaints for breaches of environmental law accounted for over one 
third of all infringement cases investigated by the Commission.102 As a result of those 
complaints, the Commission brought 65 cases against Member States before the Court 
and issued 137 reasoned opinions (on the basis of Article 226 EC). Even though it is very 
                                                
99 Explanatory Memorandum, Proposal for a Directive on the Protection of the Environment through 
Criminal Law, 2007/0022 (COD). 
100 Comte, F. ‘Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law: Destiny of the Various European 
Union’s Initiatives’ in Europe and the Environment ed. Marco Odina (2004) p. 43. 
101 Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC 2003 804. 
102 The 6th Annual Survey on the Implementation and Enforcement of Community Environmental Law 
(Dec 2004) also shows this consistent pattern of one third of all complaints accounting for breaches of 
EC environmental law. See Martin Hedemman-Robinson, above n. 85, p. 42.   
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difficult to find reliable figures on the extent of environmental crime in the EU, given that 
those activities are generally prohibited and clandestine, the actual extent of 
environmental crimes must be very high103. 
 
The Commission relies heavily on third parties to bring complaints to its attention (e.g. 
injured parties, NGOs). The Commission must institute proceedings before the ECJ under 
the Article 226 procedure against the Member State for its failure to implement EC 
environmental law, rather than the individual polluter. This indirect application of 
sanctions to offenders is arguably not very effective to ensure compliance with EC 
environmental law104. But the procedure introduced under Article 228 EC by the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty, which allows the Commission to seek financial penalties against 
Member States that fail to comply with an Article 226 judgement, can indeed be a strong 
incentive for compliance.105 On the other hand, the Commission has discretion as to 
whether to institute proceedings under articles 226 and 228 EC.106  
It is not clear whether Member States are required under the Commission’s proposals for 
a directive not only to introduce but also to apply criminal sanctions for serious violations 
of EC environmental law107.  This has obvious implications to the implementation of the 
directive. Commenting on the March 2001 proposal, Michael Faure argued that it does 
not leave room for states to apply sanctions other than criminal ones for the crimes listed 
                                                
103 For a discussion on the figures and extent of environmental crimes in Europe see Comte, F., 
‘Environmental Crime and the Police in Europe: A Panorama and Possible Paths for Future Action’ 
[2006] EELR 190.   
104 See Lee, above n. 55, p.55.   
105 See Case 304/02 of 12 July 2005, in which the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ordered France to pay 
an unprecedented sum of € 20 million and a periodic 6-month penalty of € 57,761,250 running from 
that day, for failing to comply with a 1991 Court ruling on serious failings in its enforcement of 
fisheries rules.  
106 Davies, P. European Union Environmental Law: an Introduction to Key Selected Issues, Ashgate (2004) 
p. 83. Member States may bring infringement procedure under article 227 EC against other Member 
States for their failure to implement EC environmental law, but this procedure is rarely used in practice 
due to political reasons.  
107 The Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law allows 
Member States to apply sanctions other than criminal ones for violations of the environmental offences 
established in the Convention.   
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in article 3108.  It is argued that the raison d’etre of the proposed directive must be to 
force Member States to introduce and apply criminal sanctions, and a more differentiated 
approach applying both criminal and administrative sanctions would not be possible. 
Also Corstens asserts that the 2001 Commission’s proposal left no room for Member 
States to deal with offences committed intentionally or with serious negligence by means 
other than the criminal law109. According to Maria Lee, such an approach “would be a 
major step back for environmental law, flying in the face of decades of research on the 
flexibility of effective law enforcement” 110 and could “ultimately (…) be corrosive of the 
stigmatising power of the criminal law”111 However she points out that “sole reliance on 
criminal law is probably not a necessary interpretation of the Commission’s proposal, 
and is certainly nowhere stated.”112 The February 2007 proposal for a directive states 
that “Member States shall ensure that the commission of the offences referred to in 
Articles 3 and 4 is punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal 
sanctions” 113 (emphasis added), which seems to allow flexible implementation by 
Member States as regards the choice of applying either administrative or criminal 
sanctions in each particular case114.  
 
Another potential problem that may arise from the implementation of the Commission’s 
proposal for a directive is the existing variations of the criminal procedure laws and legal 
enforcement practices in Member States. Many Member States are still governed by the 
opportunity principle and there is no duty to prosecute (e.g. Belgium, the UK and the 
                                                
108 Faure, Michael, above n. 17, p.27. 
109 Corstens, G.J.M., ‘Criminal law in the first pillar?’ (2003) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law 
and Criminal Justice, p. 137. 
110 Lee, above n. p. 72. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 2007/0022 (COD), art 5 par. 1. 
114 In most EU Member States the cumulative application of administrative and criminal sanctions is 
forbidden as a violation of the principle of non bis in idem. 
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Netherlands).115 In those countries, the prosecution may decide to be tolerant of minor 
technical breaches of environmental law or, where the chances of securing a conviction 
are low, it could be decided that it is not realistic or practical to bring a prosecution116. It 
could be argued that the discretion as to whether to prosecute may diminish levels of 
compliance with environmental regulations if prosecutions are rare. However the ECJ has 
consistently held that a failure to prosecute a violation of Community law could 
constitute a breach of Article 10 EC and a Member State can be challenged before the 
Court for its failure to prosecute117. Moreover, in some EU Member States individuals 
may not bring a prosecution (e.g. Portugal, Germany), which could mean weaker 
enforcement in those states.  
 
There are presently a number of initiatives by the Council under the third pillar 
envisaging the approximation of Member States’ law in specific areas of criminal 
procedure118. Since under the Constitutional Treaty the pillar structure of the European 
Union would be abolished, approximation of both substantive and procedural criminal 
law would be at the Community level (article III-270 and III-271 CT).119 But it would 
certainly entail a great effort on the part of the Commission if it wished to approximate 
all the aspects of Member States’ criminal procedure that could affect the proper 
implementation of EC environmental (criminal) law.120  
 
                                                
115 IMPEL Network Report, above n. 33, p.60. 
116 Op. cit. p. 86. This prerogative of the prosecution may be limited in some jurisdictions e.g. in Belgium a 
circular of the attorneys general provides that dismissals of serious violations of environmental law 
could not take place for opportunistic reasons.  
117 Case C-265/95, Spanish Strawberries.  
118 E.g. Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings, O.J. 2001, L 82/1 and 
Framework Decision on confiscation of crime-related proceeds, instrumentalities and property, O.J. 
2005, L. 2005. See Weyembergh, A. ‘Approximation of Criminal Laws, The Constitutional Treaty and 
the Hague Programme’ in Common Market Law Review 42 2005 p.1569.  
119 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (OJ 2004 C 310/1). 
120 There are many other documented difficulties faced by the Commission in ensuring that EC 
environmental law is properly implemented by Member States, for example the sharing of competence 
between the central government and the regions, which means that the Commission does not have to 
deal with only one piece of legislation but several ones. See Davies, above n. 106, p. 68. 
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The creation of a level-playing field  
 
The approximation of the different approaches in Member States regarding 
environmental crimes is seen by the Commission as an advantage as it could provide a 
deterrent against transboundary crimes121. Many of the EU-15 Member States have 
introduced into their penal codes specific provisions on the protection of the 
environment: following the example of the German Strafgezetzbuch of 1980, Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and, more recently, Spain and Portugal have 
incorporated environmental offences into their penal codes.122 
 
However several studies123 provide some evidence of the disparate approaches in relation 
to the constitutive elements and penalties applicable for environmental offences in all EU 
Member States.124 As exemplified by Françoise Comte, a waste collector who knowingly 
and unlawfully disposed of waste oils into a wild forest, Member States have 
implemented Directive 75/439/CEE of the Council on waste oils in a completely different 
fashion. Under Portuguese Law, there would be a maximum fine of €2500; under Italian 
Law, a maximum fine of €10000 (or 4 times higher); and under French Law, the 
maximum applicable fine would be €75000, or 30 times higher. In its turn Belgian law 
applies for the same offence a maximum of 1 year imprisonment, whereas under Finnish 
Law a maximum of 6 years imprisonment is applied, and under Greek Law the maximum 
penalty is of 10 years imprisonment.125  
                                                
121 Explanatory Memorandum, Proposal for a Directive on the Protection of the Environment through 
Criminal Law, 2007/0022 (COD) p.3. 
122 de Sadeleer, N. ‘La Repression des Infractions en Matiere de Gestion de Dechets” in Environmental 
Crimes in Europe : Rules of Sanctions, ed. by Françoise Comte and Ludwig Kramer (2004). 
 
123  Particularly those organised by the Max Planck Institute and the Institute METRO (Masstricht 
European Institute for Transnational Legal Research), those of the group Hugle-Lepage, and those of 
the Unity of Comparative Law under the supervision of M Delmas-Marty. 
124 Bayle, M. ‘Systems of Sanctions in the Field of Environmental Criminality’, in Environmental Crimes 
in Europe: Rules of Sanctions (2004) p. 53. 
 
125 Comte, F. ‘Crime Environnemental en Europe – Regles de Sanctions: Introduction Generale’  in  
Environmental Crimes in Europe: Rules of Sanctions (2004) p. 9. 
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In its impact assessment accompanying the February 2007 proposal for a directive on the 
protection of the environment through criminal law,126 the Commission shows the 
disparity in the choice of sanctions in Member States implementing the EC Regulation on 
the protection of species of wild fauna and flora127 and EC Regulation 1013/2006 on 
shipments of waste. Regarding the trade in endangered species, the factor between the 
lowest defined maximum fine applied in Poland (€1.293) and the highest in the 
Netherlands (€450.000) is 348, and maximum prison sentences differ between 6 months 
in Luxembourg and 8 years in Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia128.  
 
The February 2007 proposal for a directive could correct the disparate approaches from 
Member States as regards the constitutive elements and level of sanctions applicable for 
environmental offences. It specifies levels of sanctions to be applied for specific 
offences129. However, it remains to be seen from the outcome of the Ship-Source 
Pollution case whether the ECJ will consider that the Community has indeed the power to 
define specific criminal offences and the level of penalties. If the ECJ decides that the EC 
does have power in those areas, harmonisation could become a strong tool for preventing 
certain Member States from becoming pollution havens due to lax environmental 
                                                
126 Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying document to the proposal for a Directive on the 
Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law: Impact Assessment, COM (2007) 51 SEC (2007) 
161, p. 3. 
 
127 Council Regulation (EC) No. 338/97, Official Journal L 061. 
128 ‘2007 Directive Impact Assessment’ above n.126, p. 17. 
129 Following the ECJ decision in case 176-03, some Member States stated that they would only be ready to 
accept “minimum maximum” penalties, that is, they may apply in practice lower sanctions than the 
threshold levels established by the EC.   
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regulation,130 especially in view of the two most recent enlargements of the EU eastwards 
(May 2004 and January 2007)131  
 
Also, on the level of judicial cooperation, harmonisation would facilitate the use of the 
European Arrest Warrant (EAW). Even though the EAW is based on the principle of 
mutual recognition (or ‘mutual trust’ in the European space) and therefore does not 
require ‘double criminality’ in the issuing and executing states132, the issuing of an EAW 
is only possible (unless the sentence has already been passed) for acts punishable in the 
issuing state by a custodial sentence or a detention order of at least twelve months. In the 
case of environmental crime, issuing the EAW without the condition of dual criminality 
requires that the offence is punishable in the issuing Member State for a maximum of at 
least three years imprisonment. The successful operation of the European Arrest Warrant, 
as well as other more recent similar developments in the area of European judicial and 
police cooperation in criminal matters (e.g. the European Evidence Warrant), could 
arguably be weakened by the present disparate sanctions presently adopted by Member 
States for implementation of EC environmental law.133   
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The harmonisation of environmental criminal law in the EU, as proposed by the 
Commission in its 2007 directive, could be a positive step forward to ensure that Member 
                                                
130 Even though according to the Law & Economics literature there does not seem to be a strong correlation 
between environmental regulation and business location generally (unlike taxes and wages), in the case 
of the highly polluting industries or those with high environmental costs this correlation is stronger 
(e.g. the pulp and petrochemical industries). See e.g. X Xu, ‘Do stringent environmental regulations 
reduce the international competitiveness of environmentally sensitive goods? A global perspective’ 27 
World Development 1999, p. 1216. 
131 Yet as pointed out by Martin Hedemann-Robinson, “intention” and “gross negligence”, for example, are 
not state-of-the-art concepts and there would be variations in the way the national Courts will apply 
them. Above n. 85, p. 517. 
132 See Alegre S. and Leaf, M. ‘Mutual Recognition in European Judicial Cooperation: A Step too Far too 
Soon? Case Study – The European Arrest Warrant’, European Law Journal, (2004) 10. 
133 ‘2007 Directive Impact Assessment’, above n. 126, p. 14. 
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States criminalise serious breaches of EC environmental law. In this vein, it is suggested 
that criminal sanctions are necessary in cases of serious violations of environmental law. 
In that sense the Commission’s initiative is correct in only requiring serious 
environmental violations to be criminalised. It was further suggested that if political 
difficulties could be circumvented, the Commission could have gone further to require 
Member States to introduce criminal sanctions against corporations.  
 
As regards the prospects for harmonisation of environmental law it is far from clear 
whether it will improve the implementation deficit of EC environmental law. Even 
though the enforcement mechanisms available to the Commission under Article 226 EC 
to ensure compliance are arguably deficient, they are certainly much stronger than most 
other supranational institutions ever held to date. Therefore, it can be expected that the 
proposal to harmonise environmental criminal law under the first pillar may lead to 
positive results, even though the existing procedural criminal law and legal enforcement 
practices in Member States may still be an impediment to effective compliance. 
 
